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ABSTRACT 
Defining and understanding what constitutes a cyber-attack is a complicated matter, 
largely due to the fact that there has not yet been a large-scale cyber-attack upon any 
nation. With the help of Michael Schmitt’s Tallinn Manual, published in 2013 by 
Cambridge University Press, it is possible to gain an understanding, although no policy 
expectations, of what elements need to be met for a cyber-attack to warrant a NATO 
response.  
This study analyzes and explores the unique position that NATO operates in and 
the duty of NATO to protect its alliance members, and member states to protect each 
other. Topics discussed include how cyber-attacks are defined and identified, the 
particular challenges of NATO when addressing cyber-attacks, the severity of cyber-
attacks, and what would need to occur in order for a victim-state to ask NATO to invoke 
Article 5.  
This thesis discusses the readiness of NATO to respond to a cyber-attack and 
what the conditions necessary for an Article 5 response, and what that response would 
potentially look like. Finally, this work provides recommendations for actions that NATO 
could take to both prevent and confront cyber attacks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Mark Twain wrote, “From the ‘London Times’ of 1904” in 1898, a science fiction 
tale that describes a marvelous invention called a “telelectroscope.” This amazing device 
is hooked to the telephone system (a fairly new invention at the time) whereupon the user 
of the device can view and talk to people all over the world. Unbeknownst to him, in his 
short story Mark Twain imagined the Internet into existence a century before it was to 
become a reality.1 Albert Einstein is quoted as saying, “Imagination is more important 
than knowledge,” a statement that has never held more weight than it does when applied 
to the cyber world, a place where nearly anything is possible, so long as the user or 
creator can imagine it. In both Mark Twain’s and Albert Einstein’s time, the Internet was 
nothing more than science fiction; an imaginary device that an author invented to make a 
story interesting, and not something that could ever legitimately exist. Now, the Internet 
and the cyber-world therein is not only a reality, it is used in almost every aspect of 
human life from recreational to entertainment to professional use, and it would be nearly 
impossible to imagine living in a world without it. 
With the increase in the use of the Internet and the easy access for individuals 
around the world to computers and the Internet, it is easier than ever for nations to utilize 
cyber warfare against their enemies. This leads to the primary question of this thesis, how 
should North American Treaty Organization (NATO) respond to a cyber-attack against a 
member country? NATO is a collection of about two dozen countries dedicated to 
working together and collaborating to ensure the safety and defense of each nation, and 
available to support militarily member states in need. Knowing that cyber-attacks are on 
the rise, the secondary focus of this thesis is to determine if NATO is prepared to respond 
to a cyber-attack on a member state, and if not, what policy changes are needed to be 
made in order for NATO to be better prepared.  
1 Crawford Kilian, “Mark Twain, Father of the Internet,” The Tyee, January 8, 2007, http://thetyee.ca/ 
Books/2007/01/08/MarkTwain/. 
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A. DEFINE THE PROBLEM 
The Internet has made the world a substantially smaller place and more connected 
in ways that were seemingly impossible before now. However, with all the positive 
things that exist thanks to the Internet and technology, there is also a sinister, 
unwholesome side that exists simultaneously. As in the physical world, the cyber world 
breeds criminals looking to make a quick buck through fraudulent means, hackers 
looking for fun, hacktivists looking to make a political or social point, terrorists looking 
to recruit new members, and finally, government organizations looking to advance their 
country’s power or position in the global hierarchy. Individuals, states, and non-state 
actors use cyber-attacks as a way to advance their agenda. Common examples of cyber-
attacks include computer viruses, worms, malware, and distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks.  
The 2007 cyber-attack on the nation of Estonia illustrates the potential for a 
serious cyber-attack and the long-lasting effects of one. For a three-and-a-half week 
period starting on April 27, 2007, and finally ending on May 18, 2007, parts of the 
nation’s Internet-based infrastructure were targets of powerful DDoS attacks.2 
Government websites were shut down, as were those of two major banks holding the 
accounts of thousands of citizens and several political parties.3 Like many nations, 
Estonia relies on its cyber infrastructure and, therefore, the 2007 attack created a major 
headache for millions of Estonians, which led some professionals to refer to it as “Web 
War I,” while others have called it a “cyber-riot.”4 The cyber-attack was even more 
damaging due to the fact that Estonia is extremely reliant on the Internet and Internet 
connections. In response to the attacks, NATO created the Centre of Excellence for 
Cyber Defense, located in Tallinn, Estonia.5 NATO also created the Cyber Defence 
Management Authority. In creating both these organizations, NATO recognized the need 
2 Stephen Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational 
Responses,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 2 (2011): 49–60, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=jss. 
3 Ibid. 
4 “War in the Fifth Domain,” July 3, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16478792. 
5 Ibid. 
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to prepare for, and respond accordingly to, any future cyber-attacks of this magnitude on 
alliance members. In addition, NATO produced a document known as the Tallinn 
Manual that, while non-binding, applies international law and NATO policies to cyber 
warfare.  
B. OVERVIEW 
NATO as an organization is designed to protect and assist member states. Though 
it had a very loose cyber policy, it did not have a clear protocol for how to respond to a 
cyber-attack against a member country. However, the attack against NATO served as a 
wake-up call and the following year NATO held its first meeting on the topic, known as 
the Bucharest Summit, to formally address the issue of cyber-attacks.6 Two divisions 
were created, the Cyber Defense Management Authority and the Cooperative Cyber 
Defense Centre of Excellence. This led to the creation of the Tallinn Manual. Produced 
by a team of international law experts led by Professor Michael Schmitt and published in 
2013, it offers guidelines on how to treat cyber warfare within international law.  
C. THESIS PROPOSAL QUESTIONS 
The central focus of the thesis is to perform a thorough analysis using three 
guiding questions to narrow the scope of the investigation of how NATO is coping with 
the potential of cyber-attacks on a member state and how the organization should respond 
to a cyber-attack. First, is NATO prepared to respond to a cyber-attack? Second, under 
what conditions would a cyber-attack trigger a NATO Article 5 response? Third and final 
is the question how would NATO respond to a cyber-attack under Article 5?  
Due to the fact that there has yet to be a cyber-attack that has forced NATO to 
respond, NATO is working to get a clearer understanding of when it would, or should, 
respond to a cyber-attack and under what conditions it would be reasonable to respond 
6 NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” last modified May 8, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natolive/official_texts_8443.htm. 
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with a response under Article 5.7 Article 5 of the Washington Treaty provides for several 
expectations of NATO in the event of a kinetic attack against a member state, which is 
now also considered to include a cyber-attack.8 The core of Article 5 revolves around 
collective defense against an aggressor state on behalf of a member state, but would be 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.9 NATO has left criteria for invoking Article 5 for a 
cyber-attack purposefully vague, possibly because there has not yet been an attack on an 
alliance member state that caused significant damage similar to that of a significant 
kinetic attack, with states mindful not to create dangerous precedent. The only substantial 
cyber-attack event that could help to understand what NATO might do is the cyber-attack 
on Estonia in 2007. Although that attack did not result in an Article 5 response, this does 
not mean there was not the possibility of retaliation. Then Minister of Defense, Jaak 
Aaviksoo reportedly contemplated seeking out NATO assistance in helping his country 
overcome the attack, suspected to have been committed by Russia or non-state Russian 
actors.10 Since the Estonia attack, the closest that NATO has moved toward defining 
when an Article 5 response would occur was at the recent 2014 summit in Wales when it 
was announced that if there were to be a cyber-attack on a member state, Article 5 could 
be invoked and lead to a response.11 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses descriptive and analytical approaches to answer the thesis 
questions. Through a careful review of Articles 4 and 5 of the Washington Treaty, as well 
as past and current responses to cyber-attacks by NATO, this thesis will outline the 
strategies that NATO employs to protect member states. Starting with a detailed analysis 
7 Article 5 is part of the Washington Treaty and provides for the ability for the United States to aid its 
allies in Europe but was first invoked by Europe to offer aid to America following the 9/11 attacks. The 
Article is meant to offer automatic support to a member state, but allows the particular state to decide how 









                                                 
of NATO and what thresholds have needed to be passed in order for NATO to organize a 
ground offensive, the thesis will draw parallels to suggest when cyber-attacks might 
evoke an Article 5 NATO response. In support of what type of events might need to 
occur in order for there to be an Article 5 response following a cyber-attack, there will be 
comparative case studies and review of the first time NATO invoked an Article 5 
response, following the September 11, 2011 terror attacks. Through a review of the 
prevailing literature and available information, inferences can be drawn as to when or 
how NATO should respond to a cyber-attack against a member country and when it 
would be appropriate to invoke an Article 6 response against a cyber-attack. The 
descriptive and analytical pieces of this thesis rely on official statements from NATO, 
experts in the field of cyber defense, and information published in official NATO 
sources. This thesis utilizes primary and secondary sources to provide a complete and 
current picture of how NATO policy has evolved and where current challenges still exist.  
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter I is the introduction, providing 
all of the pertinent background information regarding this thesis and its purpose. Chapter 
II is a brief literature review, offering background information for the reader unfamiliar 
with the topic and its importance. Chapter III pertains to NATO, the history of the 
organization, the creation, drafting, and publishing of the Tallinn Manual, and a 
discussion on Articles 4 and 5 of the Washington Treaty, including why both articles are 
important and their invocation following 9/11. Chapter IV focuses on cyber-attacks, what 
they are, major international cyber-attacks, and the problems that NATO is facing in 
terms of responding to a cyber-attack. Chapter V explores the question of whether NATO 
is prepared to respond to a cyber-attack, investigates what conditions would be necessary 
for a cyber-attack to trigger a NATO Article 5 response and studies how NATO would 
respond to a cyber-attack under Article 5. Chapter V explores what conditions would 
need to exist if NATO were to go outside of Article 5 to respond and provides 
recommendations on how NATO should respond to future cyber-attacks. Chapter VI is 
the conclusion, including areas of understanding and unresolved issues in the current 
research, areas of agreement and understanding, and a discussion of unresolved issues.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Defining and understanding what makes up a cyber-attack appears to be a simple 
task, until the topic is delved into, at which point the difficulty of the topic is realized. 
Authors have tried to create scenarios that could play out in the event of a cyber-attack, 
but often the scenarios have been perceived as alarmist and reactive, and not based on 
events that are actually likely to occur. Other authors have taken a more proactive 
approach, looking at the various laws that dictate domestically, and how those laws 
would handle cyber-attacks, which are often classified as terror attacks within the cyber 
realm.  
In the book, Cyber War, Clarke and Knake use what reads as hysterical 
overreaction to stress their point regarding the threat of cyber-attacks on the United 
States. The authors arrange the book well, hitting upon topics in a methodological order 
while also providing detailed technical analysis of the issue of cyber war, particularly in 
relation to China and Russia.12 While providing a good historical background on 
American policy on the topic of cyber warfare, the book is more of an opinion piece, 
providing their thoughts and logic on why more has not been done in order to protect the 
American people from an attack.13 Even with the questions regarding the validity of their 
beliefs, and the alarmist stance that they take, the book offers the reader substantial 
information regarding cyber warfare.  
In “Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar,” Charles Dunlap 
takes a look at the legal issues and requirements in relation to international law and 
treaties that have been ratified.14 An essential question that Dunlap attempts to describe 
and answer is what the parallels are between a conventional military attack and a cyber-
attack, specifically in terms of the Law of Armed Conflict.15 The Law of Armed Conflict 
12 Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War (New York City: Harper Collins, 2011). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Charles J. Dunlap Jr., “Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar,” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly Spring 2011 (2011), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/dunlap.pdf. 
15 Ibid. 
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is a principle element of international law that seeks to limit all unnecessary violence and 
unwarranted military action. Dunlap also introduces the idea that cyber-warfare and 
cyber-crime are two substantial threats facing the West right now and that there need to 
be more preventative measures introduced in order to address the threat.16 According to 
Dunlap, the introduction of the Stuxnet virus and the WikiLeaks document drop have led 
some to believe that all-out cyber war is inevitable, if not already underway but 
undetected.17 
Hathaway et al. also address the issue of law and cyber-attacks, stressing the 
importance of the international legal system while also providing tangible steps that can 
be taken in order to shore up American security and NATO partner states.18 They claim 
that cyber-attacks are becoming more and more sophisticated, agreeing with Dunlap 
regarding their strength and danger, and capable of shutting down nuclear centrifuges, 
electric grids, or air defense systems.19 They argue that it is important for cyber-attacks 
to be treated with the sense of urgency that is needed, and in some cases should be treated 
as acts of war.20 Hathaway et al. introduce many ways that laws already in place can be 
applied to cyber-attacks, while making it a point to define cyber-attacks, which many 
scholars struggle to do.21 The most effective suggestion made by Hathaway et al. is for 
the United States to use its ability to strengthen domestic law by making cyber-attacks 
extraterritorial and adopting very limited countermeasures to fight against cyber-attacks, 
which do not qualify as an appropriately comparable kinetic attack to trigger an armed 
response.22 
16 Dunlap Jr., “Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar.” 
17 Ibid. 
18 Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, Aileen Nowlan, William Perdue, 







                                                 
Henry S. Kenyon, in “Cyber Attacks Reveal Lessons,” reviews the Estonia cyber-
attacks that took place in April and May 2007 and introduced to the public the new cyber-
attack: hard to track, hard to fight, hard to detect, and a threat to international security.23 
Kenyon claims that the attacks were so damaging to Estonia that they nearly paralyzed 
the government and almost forced a complete shutdown of services as the country relies 
extensively on e-commerce and online transactions, two areas of infrastructure that were 
targeted.24 The attacks on Estonia were likely perpetrated by Russia, but that is 
determined largely by using context clues, with Kenyon pointing out that there were 
political and social events taking place with the government removing a war memorial of 
the Red Army out of a town center and into a cemetery.25 The statue caused a substantial 
amount of civil unrest with many Estonians believing that the statue was a negative 
symbol of their oppression during the Soviet years and their time living as part of the 
Soviet Union, while ethnic Russians felt slighted and believe that the statue is a 
monument of Russian sacrifice.26 The attacks against Estonia, Kenyon points out, are 
unique in that it was not a single, sustained attack but several attacks aimed at different 
infrastructure, with the denial-of-service attacks debilitating due to the e-commerce 
society Estonia is so proud of.27 
Herzog writes on the same topic as Kenyon, the Estonian cyber-attacks and the 
effect of the attacks, as well as the multinational responses. Making Estonia unique is the 
fact the government relies on digital infrastructure, which also makes Estonia an easy 
target for denial-of-service attacks.28 According to Herzog, there are only a small handful 
of advanced cyber-warfare states, including China, the United States, Russia, and Israel, 
leading these countries, and their adversaries, to investigate further their own cyber-
23 Henry S. Kenyon, “Cyber Attacks Reveal Lessons,” Signal 63, no. 11 (2009), 
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=cyber-attacks-reveal-lessons. 




28 Stephen Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational 
Responses,” Journal of Strategic Security 4, no. 2 (2011): 49–60. 
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attack capabilities.29 NATO, unable to truly point a finger because there was no trail, 
stated rather clearly that the attack on Estonia was the concentrated efforts of a single 
state, and due to the geopolitics at the time, that state was likely Russia.30 Unlike 
Kenyon, and the other authors reviewed here, Herzog jumps into NATO Article 5 
headfirst, stating that had Russia attacked Estonia using conventional means, such as 
tanks and bombs, NATO would have had to invoke Article 5, yet NATO did not mount 
such a response.31 An attack or attempt to stop Russia could have had serious detrimental 
effects against Russia, particularly pertaining to their valuable and economically 
necessary energy, which provides much of Russia’s wealth.32 Then, Herzog delves into 
the multinational response to the Estonia cyber-attack, labeling the attack a “mild version 
of a new form of digital violence,” and highlighting the seriousness of the issue.33 
Keiran Hardy questions what affect that post-9/11 lawmaking had on the issue of 
cyber-terrorism, looking at the issue by comparing U.S. laws to commonalities in laws of 
four Commonwealth states: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom. 
Hardy attempts to provide a framework of debate by critiquing the legislation that was 
passed following 9/11 and could be utilized in prosecuting cyber-attacks.34 Hardy calls 
the U.S. legislation draconian and exceptional, but refrains from calling it unlawful, 
stating that the Americans save the harshest penalties for when cyber-attacks cause or 
attempt to cause death.35 The four Commonwealth countries, in an attempt to truly attack 
the problem of cyber-attacks, instead proffer a low threshold of harm and high penalties 
up to life in jail for any act of terrorism focusing on the digital or electronic systems or 
29 Ibid. 





34 Keiran Hardy, “WWWMDs: Cyber-Attacks Against Infrastructure in Domestic Anti-Terror Laws,” 




                                                 
infrastructure.36 Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom hold the 
crimes to a much lower standard when compared to the United States, with Hardy subtly 
hinting that maybe the United States should better focus anti-terrorism laws to include 
true cyber-attacks, and offer penalties for acts of cyber-terrorism less extreme than death-
inducing.37 
In “NATO: Defending Against the Known Unknowns,” Tony Morbin focuses on 
the 200-person cyber security NATO team that is responsible for protecting NATO’s 
networks, and providing and implementing cyber-security solutions.38 Morbin states 
there are, every single day, more than 200 million potential cyber-attacks against 
NATO’s systems by states, crime syndicates, terrorist organizations, and hacktivists.39 
While acknowledging that some of those are falsely reporting as cyber-attacks, this does 
highlight the scope of the issue of security and the need for organizations, NATO 
included, to take cyber-security extremely serious. According to Chief of Cyber Security 
for the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI), Ian West, interviewed 
by Morbin, the goal is to get the number of attempted attacks needing intervention down 
to ten per day, which is a reasonable goal with careful programming.40 Morbin’s article 
highlights the true capabilities of NATO today, and the fact that NATO is prepared to 
handle a cyber-attack if one is launched against it, just leaving open the issue of what 
NATO would do if one of the alliances’ member states were to suffer a cyber-attack. 
West, in highlighting the singular goal of NATO, to defend NATO, points out that all of 
their work in the cyber-world is based around defending against a cyber-attack.41 While 
this is a logical and necessary approach, NATO could also share its technology and 
36 Ibid. 
37 Hardy, “WWWMDs: Cyber-Attacks Against Infrastructure in Domestic Anti-Terror Laws,” 152–
161. 






                                                 
knowledge with member states to help them be better protected from cyber-attacks as 
well. 
Jeffrey Caton authored a substantial and thorough document, “Distinguishing 
Acts of War in Cyberspace: Assessment Criteria, Policy Considerations, and Response 
Implications,” for The United States Army War College. Caton immediately addresses the 
fact that there is no internationally accepted definition of what a hostile action is in 
cyberspace.42 The intended purpose of his manuscript is to provide policy makers, 
politicians, military leaders, and decision makers a foundational background in the issue 
of cyber-attacks and hostile actions in cyberspace for the formation of cyber policy.43 
Caton not only provides policy considerations, but he also provides detailed assessment 
criteria utilizing information from international bodies, such as the United Nations.44 
Finally, Caton provides the reader with courses of action that can be taken while 
addressing the various influences that have an effect on decision makers and the ways to 
overcome them.45 While seeming to make great promises in the information he is going 
to offer, Caton admits that it would be impossible for him to come up with the perfect 
solution. Instead, he offers various options and ideas, supported by data and international 
law. Caton remains honest in his discussion of each topic, admitting that there is no 
international legal definition of what a cyber-attack would look like, but then offers his 
own definition of the concept for the reader, even if it is broad.46  
There is a remarkable void in the literature addressing cyber-attacks and Article 5, 
but this may be because there has not yet been a cyber-attack of sufficient severity to 
trigger an Article 5 response, or perhaps scholars are focused more on legality under the 
UN Charter, particularly Articles 2(4) on use of force and Article 51 on armed attacks 
(plus international humanitarian law). Since NATO’s Article 5 is based on UN Article 
42 Jeffrey L. Caton, Distinguishing Acts of War in Cyberspace: Assessment Criteria, Policy 
Considerations, and Response Implications (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The United States Army War College, 






                                                 
51, what is determined for 51 also applies to Article 5. There are a few articles that 
handle the issue in the abstract, but they are filled with conjecture. While there is no 
international definition of what a cyber-attack is, academics and policymakers do believe 
they have an understanding of what a cyber-attack would look like. Similarly, academics 
seem to agree that when there is a cyber-attack worthy of an Article 5 response, it will be 
obvious and comparable to a kinetic attack. With all of the questions regarding what a 
cyber-attack would need to look like in order to garner a response, there is consensus that 
such a picture is hard to draw until there is an event. The cyber-attack on Estonia is the 
only cyber-attack that might have warranted an Article 5 response, but did not result in 
any type of response, leaving the people of Estonia exposed until the attacks were finally 
thwarted.  
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III. NATO 
A. HISTORY OF NATO 
NATO was officially created on April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, with the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Portugal signing what became 
known as the Washington Treaty.47 NATO was unique upon its official creation due to 
the fact it was the first peacetime military-based alliance that the United States had ever 
entered into that did not focus on the Western Hemisphere.48 NATO was formed for 
three overarching purposes, in the words of Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary 
General, “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”49  
Of the Washington Treaty’s fourteen articles, Article 5 provides NATO’s core 
collective defense commitment and is the most significant for the purpose of this thesis. 
Article 5 states that: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result 
thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security.50 
 
47 “Milestones: 1945–1952; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949,” accessed March 12, 
2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato. 
48 Ibid. 
49 David Reynolds, The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 13.  
50 “North Atlantic Treaty,” accessed March 13, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_ 
texts_17120.htm. 
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Article 4 precedes Article 5 and states: 
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, 
the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the 
Parties is threatened.51 
Article 4 is not difficult to understand. It clearly states that alliance members will 
meet, talk about the problem facing one or all of them, and then decide as a group what 
the best course of action should be. In practice, Article 4 would bring together the 
members of NATO, and Article 5 provides the capability for member states to support, 
militarily, NATO member states under attack or requiring defense.  
During the first several decades of NATO’s existence, this collective defense 
commitment was focused on ensuring that the Soviet Red Army did not advance further 
through Europe. Article 5 provided the European states with the reassurance they needed 
that the United States would intervene on their behalf in the event of Soviet attack.  
This reassurance generally sufficed despite serious questions regarding the ability 
of the Americans to act because of U.S. constitutional constraints. The European NATO 
members did not just want reassurance that the United States would intervene on their 
behalf, but they wanted the United States to do so automatically, and without having to 
seek approval from a potentially hostile Congress.52 This was complicated by the U.S. 
Constitution, which provides Congress the sole authority to declare war; through 
negotiations it was written that the United States would be able to seek approval from 
Congress for any large-scale military incursion.53 There were also issues when it comes 
to the need of the European countries to have the United States provide military 
assistance in an attempt to rebuild the decimated defense system following the close of 
the Second World War.54 The European states each wanted unconditional grants for the 
process of rebuilding and refocusing their defense systems, but the United States, as the 
largest funder of NATO, wanted the aid to be based on, and contingent upon, regional 





                                                 
coordination.55 The all-encompassing negotiations ended with the signing of the Treaty 
and led to the declaration that an attack on a member state was like an attack on each 
state and should be treated as such.56 
Surprisingly, it was the communist uprising and outbreak of the Korean War that 
led to NATO fully developing into the organization that it is today. Thirteen months 
following the official creation of NATO, war broke out on the Korean Peninsula, and 
member states were once again forced to recognize the increasing threat of communism 
around the globe.57 The Korean War saw the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE) form to help direct and disperse forces throughout Europe; this was 
overseen by Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander.58 During this same 
period of time, there was an increase in the number of troops on the ground, in order to 
match what the Soviet’s had lined up, waiting patiently for the allies to act; NATO was 
forced to create military plans that would be adhered to when in a state of war.59 
France struggled with the dominant role that the United States took within NATO 
and the close relationship between The United States and the United Kingdom. When 
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan did not respond to France in 
the way that President Charles de Gaulle had hoped, de Gaulle sought out other allies in 
the event that East Germany invaded West Germany.60 De Gaulle pulled back the 
Mediterranean Fleet, banned all nuclear weapons from French soil, and removed all fleets 
from NATO Command. As a result, SHAPE move from a Paris suburb to Casteau, 
Belgium.61 De Gaulle’s infuriating move complicated the Cold War alliances and would 
55 “Milestones: 1945–1952; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949.”  
56 Ibid. 
57 David C. Isby, and Charles Kamps, Jr., Armies of NATOs Central Front (New York City, NY: 
Jane’s Information Group, 1985), 14.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. 
60 National Defense University, Allied Command Structures in the New NATO (Collingdale, PA: 
Diane Publishing, 1997), 50. 
61 Ibid., 53.  
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go on for 43 years.62 France would finally fully rejoin NATO under President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, highlighting the changing conditions of French security.63 Sarkozy made it a 
point to reunite with NATO as part of his plan to strengthen ties to the United States, and 
helping to redefine the mission of NATO in the 21st century.64  
During the Cold War, NATO’s primary function was to defend Europe against the 
Warsaw Pact nations led by the Soviet Union. Because much of this defense relied on 
U.S. nuclear deterrence, a substantial amount of the Cold War involved showing strength, 
though not through military incursions. The goal of NATO to maintain the security of the 
member nations with nuclear deterrence unintentionally resulted in a nuclear arms race 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.65 Later in the Cold War, the U.S.-led 
policy of détente was in part meant to ensure that NATO states could match the defenses 
of Warsaw Pact states while curbing nuclear buildups and stabilizing relations. When 
non-nuclear NATO states signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, the 
United States held on to its nuclear weapons in part because maintaining extended 
deterrence guarantees to these NATO allies was a condition of their own nuclear 
forbearance.66  
At the end of the Cold War, NATO had to reevaluate its position now that the 
Soviet Union had fallen and the organization was no longer needed to protect against an 
aggressive communist regime. The November 1991 Rome Summit saw the approval of a 
new strategic concept that realigned the purpose of NATO in the new, communist-free 
Europe.67 The new concept saw the need for smaller and more flexible forces, not a 
massive buildup of troops waiting for the invasion of the multi-million strong Soviet 
Army; it also called for a focus on the traditional defense mission and not, just the Soviet 
62 Edward Cody, “After 43 Years, France to Rejoin NATO as Full Member,” Washington Post, March 
12, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/11/AR2009031100547.html. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to 
Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1994), 661. 
66 Ibid., 657–664. 
67 “Milestones: 1993–2000; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949,” accessed March 12, 
2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/evolution-of-nato. 
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enemy.68 Through the Rome Summit, there were important discussions and decisions 
made regarding the European Union and NATO’s role in the growing body, and for the 
first time NATO truly took part in the discussion regarding the strategic architecture of 
Europe and became a partner with other European-based groups.69 This was further 
cemented following the 1994 Brussels Summit and the creation of a Combined Joint Task 
Force, as well as discussions over enlargement of NATO.70 
Enlargement was an issue that was hotly debated and contested with policymakers 
concerned about the cost and implications of introducing more states into the alliance. In 
late 1996, NATO finally announced that they were going to expand and invite new 
member states in July 1997 after a summit that was to be held in Madrid.71 The dominant 
concern was with Russia, and how the Russian government would feel about an expanded 
NATO, and what effect that would have on the delicate balance of democracy that had 
been embraced. President Boris Yeltsin and President Bill Clinton would discuss this 
issue face-to-face in March 1997 at a summit in Helsinki, Finland.72 The meeting went 
exceptionally well, and it was agreed upon that both countries, while in disagreement 
over the expansion of NATO, would consult and make joint decisions whenever possible 
in regards to Russia and NATO security.73 
B. NATO AND THE TALLINN MANUAL 
The Tallinn Manual, prepared by the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of 
Excellence and published by Cambridge University Press, is an attempt to apply 
customary international law to generate legal principles for the developing field of cyber 
warfare.74 The Cyber Defense Center is an International Military Organization accredited 






74 Michael N. Schmitt, “International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual 
Juxtaposed,” Harvard International Law Journal Online 54 (December 2012): 13. 
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by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s top political decision making arm. The 
Tallinn Manual, though written by a panel of experts on international law, does not hold 
legal authority. Nevertheless, it can be used to help guide a response following a cyber-
attack on a member nation. In the newly developing field of cyber warfare, it is important 
that what constitutes an armed attack be defined, since this threshold triggers the right to 
utilize self-defense. Part A, Chapter II, Section 2 deals specifically with self-defense in 
the Tallinn Manual and is the focus of this section. Rules 13 through 17 apply to 
responses that use force.  
The task of understanding when a cyber-attack qualifies as a true attack on 
another state is difficult due to the lack of an agreed-upon definition for such an attack. 
That being said, there are not firm globally-agreed definitions for “use of force” or 
“armed attack” either. It is in NATO’s best interest, at least while the field of cyber 
warfare is still developing, to remain ambiguous to ensure states can act with their own 
best interests without limitation or legal hindrance. The information provided in the 
Tallinn Manual is largely written in the abstract, possibly because it seeks to frame an 
ethics for cyber conflict in a world that is only now starting to get to the point at which 
significant harm can be caused via a cyber-attack. The potential for damage has most 
recently been displayed by North Korea in attacking Sony Entertainment over the release 
of a movie it found repugnant.75 November 2014 saw North Korea hack into Sony’s 
computers, destroy data, and steal a substantial amount of information, which was then 
released to the public in a series of humiliating data dumps.76 As the field becomes more 
developed, and as more attacks, such as the one by North Korea occur, it will be in the 
NATO member states’ best interest to better define cyber warfare as it is experienced and 
the damage caused can be evaluated. 
75 Oliver Laughland, “FBI Director Stands by Claim that North Korea Was Source of Sony Cyber-
Attack,” The Guardian, January 7, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/07/fbi-director-
north-korea-source-sony-cyber-attack-james-comey. 
76 Ibid.  
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Rule 13, “Self-Defense Against Armed Attack,” focuses on the right that all states 
have to defend themselves in the event of a cyber-attack.77 For an attack to constitute an 
armed action, a trans-border element is essential, which results when one state attacks 
another, or when a state targets another by utilizing a non-state actor to behave in such a 
way that it would conduct an attack in the name of that state.78 This definition becomes 
more convoluted when the attack occurs by a non-state actor not acting under the 
direction of the state.79 There are many questions raised when it comes to the very core 
of the NATO alliance and the promise that states have made to come to the defense of 
one another when they are attacked. Understanding the role of a cyber-attack in providing 
a response is important and will slowly develop, as there is more experience with cyber-
attacks.  
Much like kinetic attacks, when a state is attacked via the cyber-world, the right to 
use force as a means of self-defense is extended to the cyber realm.80 The International 
Group of Experts that created the Tallinn Manual agreed that a cyber-attack could be 
significant enough to warrant classifying as an armed attack. They also agreed that 
labeling it as such would be in accordance with the Nuclear Weapons Advisory81 opinion 
of the International Court of Justice, which concluded that the means of attack is 
immaterial to its classification.82 For a state to exercise its right of self-defense, the 
consequences of the cyber-attack would need to have resulted in serious suffering or 
death, similar to what would warrant self-defense in a kinetic attack.83 The Manual also 
states that “armed” does not have to include “weapons,” and that emphasis should be 
placed upon the effects caused in the attack.84 
77 Michael Schmitt, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare: Prepared 
by the International Group of Experts at the Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 53. 








                                                 
Rule 13 includes criteria that would delineate an armed attack, namely the scale 
and effect of the attack.85 Although the rule is ambiguous, because it fails to define scale 
and effect of an attack, it is drawn from the Nicaragua86 judgment that stated a difference 
must exist between the worst types of use of force and the less grave types of force.87 
While situations occur in which this difference is very clear, for instance, when people 
are killed, instances could also occur when the consequences of the attack are less 
obvious, which makes it difficult to know if the attack meets the scale and effect 
requirement.88 The Group of Experts stated that if the cyber-attack merely gathered 
intelligence information, engaged in cyber theft, or resulted in other non-essential 
information being gathered, characterizing it as an armed attack would be 
inappropriate.89 They noted that the question of whether cyber-attacks that did not cause 
death, injury, damage, or destruction could be considered armed attacks was unsettled 
and that there were no clear lines delineating such attacks. They considered a cyber-
attack on the New York Stock Exchange that caused the market to crash. Although no 
one would be physically hurt, some argued that the attack could be considered an armed 
attack owing to its possibly catastrophic effects.90 
The Tallinn Manual states in Rules 14 and 15 that the right to use force in self-
defense depends on necessity, proportionality, imminence, and immediacy.91 The Group 
of Experts also expects that the victim-state will demand that the aggressor-state stop the 
85 Ibid. 
86 The Nicaragua judgment comes from Nicaragua v. United States that was heard by the International 
Court of Justice and decided in 1986. The judgment came following the U.S.’ support of the Contras during 
the rebellion against the Nicaraguan government with judgment falling in favor of Nicaragua. The holding 
of the judgment found that the United States had interfered with state sovereignty and intervened in the 
affairs of Nicaragua, which helped to create clarification in the area of acting in self-defense by creating a 
concept of the threshold of force necessary to retaliate. International Court of Justice, “Military and 
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua,” June 1986, http://www.icjcij.org/docket/?sum=367&p1 
=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5. 
87 Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, 54. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., 55. 
91 Ibid., 58. 
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activities comprising the attack.92 Rule 14 deals specifically with necessity and 
proportionality, which must be met to apply force in self-defense, and were first 
introduced into the discourse of self-defense during the Nuremberg trials.93 The principle 
of necessity requires that force be used only when non-forceful means would be 
insufficient. It is expected that non-forceful means will be attempted to end the situation, 
with the necessity to escalate to force always judged from the perspective of the victim-
state.94 Non-forceful means would typically manifest through diplomatic channels, talks 
between embassies, and resolutions passed by the United Nations. Proportionality is how 
much force is permitted, including in a cyber-attack that can be used in self-defense.95 
Proportionality limits the scope, scale, duration, and intensity to the minimum amount 
necessary to stop the situation and return to the status quo.96 
There are several sections of the Tallinn Manual that NATO member states can 
refer to in determining if a cyber-attack warrants a NATO response. Rule 15 of the 
Tallinn Manual considers requirements for imminence and immediacy. Article 5197 of 
the United Nations Charter does not explicitly grant permission to act defensively when it 
is merely believed that an armed attack will occur, but that does not mean that a potential 
victim-state should wait to be attacked.98 In reality, a state should have the ability to 
protect its people; a potential victim-state has the ability to participate in anticipatory 
92 Ibid., 59. 
93 Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, 59. 
94 Ibid., 59–60. 
95 Ibid., 60. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that when an armed attack occurs against a Member 
State there is nothing that prohibits the right of self-defense until the Security Council addresses the issue in 
order to restore peace and security. “Charter of the United Nations, art. 51,” ch. VII. 1945, http://www.un. 
org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. 
98 Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, 60. 
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self-defense, which is provided for following the Caroline99 incident in the 19th 
century.100 The Group of Experts acknowledged that some commentators believe it is 
never permissible to act in anticipatory self-defense, that use of force is only acceptable 
following an actual attack.101 Regardless, the Group of Experts rejects the strict temporal 
analysis resulting in self-defense being triggered only after being attacked and agrees that 
an armed attack needs to be imminent to result in anticipatory use of force in self-
defense.102 The aggressive state needs to be preparing an attack, not just merely gaining 
the ability to launch an attack sometime in the future, which can be difficult to define due 
to the changing set of circumstances as each situation unfolds.103  
Immediacy is what distinguishes an act of self-defense from an act of retaliation, 
with acts of retaliation never being permissible.104 An even more difficult issue than 
differentiating between retaliation and self-defense is assessing the period of time that 
determines how long a state can wait before using force in self-defense following an 
armed attack against it.105 Cyber warfare makes determining immediacy difficult because 
of the nature of a cyber-attack, which is important for NATO due to the expectation that 
member states will support each other when they become victims. Complicating matters 
even more, a victim-state might not even be aware that an attack is occurring on its 
systems, or the person committing the attack might not be known until following the 
attack when the damage is discovered and finally understood.106  
99 The aftermath of the Caroline Incident introduced into international law the concept of preemptive 
military force. A United States ship, the Caroline, attempted to provide aid to Canada in 1837 while 
Canada was engaging in an anti-British insurrection, which resulted in British troops crossing from Canada 
into American waters, boarding the Caroline, murdering several Americans, and then setting the ship on 
fire before sending it over Niagara Falls. The British claimed their actions were legal and in self-defense, 
but following diplomatic tensions between the United Kingdom and the United States Secretary of State, 
Daniel Webster, the United Kingdom would eventually apologize for its actions. Anthony Clark Arend, 
“International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,” The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2003): 
89–103. 
100 Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, 60. 
101 Ibid., 61. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., 62. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., 62–63. 
106 Ibid., 63. 
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Rule 16 covers collective self-defense, reiterating the need for necessity, 
proportionality, imminence, and immediacy in the exercise of such.107 Rule 17 invokes 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states that when it is discovered that a cyber-attack is 
underway or has already occurred, the violation of Article 51 should be reported to the 
United Nations Security Council immediately.108 At this point, if the situation is enough 
to be referred to the UN Security Council, it should be assumed that it is extensive 
enough for NATO to respond in defense of a members state under cyber-attack. 
The Tallinn Manual uses expert opinion and imagined scenarios in its 
development of rules, which have yet to be applied in any serious “real-life” scenario as it 
relates to a cyber-attack. However, the publication of the Tallinn Manual is a step 
forward in cyber defense. 
C. ARTICLES 4 AND 5, AND THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS 
Some indications of how NATO might invoke Article 5 in response to a cyber-
attack may be found by examining the only time Article 5 has been invoked at all. On 
September 11, 2001 the worst terrorist attack ever to occur on American soil resulted in 
about 3,000 murdered civilians in New York City, Washington, DC, and a field in 
western Pennsylvania. Four hijacked planes were turned into powerful weapons, killing 
thousands at the World Trade Center in Towers 1 and 2, and at the Pentagon. Article 5, 
which provides the basis for the NATO alliance and which holds the true power of the 
entire organization, was invoked following the 9/11 attacks due to the extraordinary 
nature of the attack. On September 12, 2001, for the first time since the Washington 
Treaty was signed, NATO invoked Article 5, with Secretary General Lord Robertson 
subsequently informing the United Nations of NATO’s decision.109 The NAC, in their 
subsequent statement on deliberations on deciding to invoke Article 5, stated, “if it 
determined that the attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it would be 
107 Ibid. 
108 Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, 64. 
109 “Collective Defense,” accessed March 14, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_ 
110496.htm. 
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regarded as an action covered by Article 5.”110 Three weeks later, on October 2, 2001 
NATO determined that the United States was attacked by enemy combatants and that the 
attacks were covered by the provisions of the Washington Treaty and Article 5.111 
The alliance agreed that the attack on the United States was significant enough to 
invoke Article 5 for the following reasons: 
• The attack was extremely severe that resulted in the loss of many lives and 
extreme damage to property 
• The attack was executed with the use of improvised missiles (i.e., 
commercial planes) and therefore constituted “armed attack.”112 
• The attacks were conducted by a foreign enemy  
• The attacks were planned 
• The attacks were unprovoked  
• In his statement following the September 11th attacks that explained the 
process leading to NATO’s decision, Lord Robertson stated that in nearly 
six hours of considerations and conversations with distressed Prime 
Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and other officials, there was unanimous 
agreement in supporting the United States through Article 5.113 Lord 
Robertson, who had to engage EU leadership, as well as the NATO 
Council, knew that Article 5, when written, had other circumstances in 
mind, not a terror attack of the magnitude of September 11th, but that he 
understood the entire world had changed, and NATO was going to have to 
transform in order to be effective.114 
By invoking Article 5, NATO members offered statements in support of the 
United States, while also proffering statements condemning the terror attacks in the 
strongest possible way.115 This was followed by several consultations among NATO 
members on what collective action should be taken with the understanding that the 
United States could also act unilaterally under the rights afforded to states that have been 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Edgar Buckley, “Invoking Article 5,” NATO Review, Summer 2006, http://www.nato.int/docu/ 
review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html. 
113 Lord George Robertson, “Being NATOs Secretary General on 9/11,” NATO Review, accessed 
March 14, 2015, http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2011/11september/Lord_Robertson/EN/index.htm. 
114 Ibid. 
115 “Collective Defense,” accessed March 14, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_1104 
96.htm. 
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attacked in the United Nations Charter.116 October 4, 2001 saw NATO agree to eight 
measures of support to the United States; the United States asked NATO for assistance, 
and NATO engaged in their first anti-terror mission, known as Eagle Assist, which lasted 
until May 2002.117 This was followed by a second anti-terror operation, named Active 
Endeavor, with segments of NATO’s naval forces being sent to the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea and working to deter and detect terror based activity.118 
While NATO offered its full support to the United States, the United States 
selected its coalitions on a “case-by-case and mission-by-mission basis.”119 This led to 
significant speculation that the mission and purpose of NATO, even in invoking its most 
sacred and important article, had outlived its usefulness. There were questions about 
whether NATO could be successful as it was during the Balkans missions due to the 
United States choosing which coalitions it wanted to build instead of taking the whole of 
the NATO alliance.120 There were also questions raised about the effectiveness in Iraq 
and Afghanistan of the ad hoc coalitions that the United States chose, and if there could 
have been a more positive, and shorter war, had NATO been fully included in the 
operations.121 
In the years since the invocation of Article 5 following the 9/11 attacks, questions 
have been raised about the failure to invoke it before the attacks and in the years since.122 
In 1991, Article 5 was considered to assist with the First Gulf War, although Germany 
objected believing that the Iraqi missile attack on Turkey was not sufficient to invoke an 
Article 5 response.123 Germany strongly believed that because the attack on Turkey had 
been in retaliation for the aggressive actions taken by Alliance members against Iraq, it 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 “Collective Defense.” 
119 Ellen Hallams, “The Transatlantic Alliance Renewed: The United States and NATO since 9/11,” 
Journal of Transatlantic Studies (Routledge), 7, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 41. 
120 Ibid., 44–46. 
121 Ibid., 49.  
122 Thomas Fedyszyn, “Saving NATO: Renunciation of the Article 5 Guarantee,” Orbis 54, no. 3 
(2010): 377. 
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was unacceptable for NATO to invoke Article 5 in response to Iraq’s retaliation.124 This 
issue was once again revisited in 2007 following the cyber-attack in Estonia, which likely 
originated in Russia, and which will be discussed later in this thesis.125 
 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., 280. 
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IV. CYBER-ATTACKS 
A. WHAT IS A CYBER-ATTACK? 
There is some acknowledged difficulty in concretely defining what a cyber-attack 
is, at least in absolute terms. As our society has modernized, it has become more and 
more connected to the Internet, creating opportunity for enemies and criminals to take 
advantage of security holes and cause damage to computer systems, steal financial data, 
or acquire sensitive secrets. As technology becomes cheaper and cheaper to purchase, and 
access to the Internet expands, the barriers that might have otherwise prevented a terrorist 
organization or rogue state from gaining access to sensitive computer networks and 
servers are reduced. Today, anyone with a laptop, high-speed Internet connection, and the 
relevant knowledge could bring an organization or government to its knees.  
When a hostile nation attacks another state by launching a rocket into their 
territory, it is generally obvious and easy to define who the perpetrator is. In cyber space, 
it can be a considerable challenge to know who the aggressive actor is. According to the 
Tallinn Manual, a cyber-attack is an offensive or defense cyber operation that is 
“reasonably” expected to either cause injury or death to people or destruction to 
objects.126 While the Tallinn Manual is non-binding and does not qualify as international 
law, it does provide guidance to any state needing it. It is difficult, and perhaps unwise, to 
concretely define a cyber-attack as technology changes rapidly, and a narrow definition 
might prove too inflexible to remain useful.  
B. MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CYBER-ATTACKS 
There have been a handful of major international cyber-attacks, although none 
have been to the level that would have invoked an Article 5 response if suffered by a 
NATO country. Many of the attacks were on specific segments of the country. The 
December 2006 cyber-attack on NASA forced the agency to block and prevent all emails 
with attachments from being opened out of fear of causing harm to upcoming shuttle 
126 Schmitt, Tallinn Manual, 54. 
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launches.127 A 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia will be detailed in the following section; 
another 2007 cyber-attack hit the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Pentagon.128 The 
year 2008 saw a cyber-attack in Georgia, likely perpetrated either by Russia, or a Russian 
proxy, that left graffiti on many government websites, but did not cause substantial 
harm.129 The link to Russia was made as during this cyber-attack, Russia was engaged in 
military action against Georgia, a former Soviet bloc state. Perhaps one of the most 
damaging cyber-attacks, known as Stuxnet, employed malware that was released in 
October 2010 and aimed to harm the Iranian nuclear program.130 A 2013 cyber-attack on 
South Korea affected financial institutions and broadcaster YTN, which was reported to 
be the work of North Korean hackers.131 
C. NATO AND THE PROBLEM WITH CYBER-ATTACKS 
To date, NATO, along with nearly every other nation on this planet, has had great 
difficulty in dealing with the problem of cyber-attacks. While cyber-attacks are hard to 
stop for many reasons, the biggest obstacle is the difficulty in tracing a cyber-attack back 
to the culprit. The Internet offers a realm for cyber-criminals, hacktivists, hackers, and 
government agencies to operate anonymously. How does an organization, such as NATO 
deal with a massive cyber-attack on an alliance member if it is unable to prove the 
identity of the attacker? NATO’s number one role is to protect their member states, with 
the hope of remaining peaceful, but being unafraid to intervene militarily if need be. It is 
not the role of NATO to accuse non-alliance members haphazardly of orchestrating a 
cyber-attack on a member country without proof.  
Another problem with cyber-attacks and NATO’s role in dealing with them is to 
evaluate and determine when a cyber-attack meets the criteria set by NATO to intervene. 
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When looking at a cyber-attack, NATO needs to determine whether the attack crosses the 
threshold into an armed attack, which is extraordinarily difficult. Most small-scale attacks 
(the kind NATO would not consider for an Article 5 response) are a result of hobbyists 
experimenting with computer viruses and other malicious code and criminals looking for 
a way to steal cash. For example, organized crime groups use a variety of techniques to 
make money, such as “shady advertising schemes, online scams, and other attacks, to 
make money. Today worldwide criminal businesses are based on cyber-crime.”132 Some 
of the common attacks use spyware, botnets, spam and phishing, credit card fraud and 
identity theft, corporate information theft, and denial of service extortion.133 For obvious 
reasons, small-scale attacks are not something NATO would necessarily be interested in, 
while large-scale attacks can be waged by nation-states or non-state actors seeking to 
cause widespread damage. Several methods can be used for a large-scale attack including 
DDoS floods exploiting infrastructure components and damaging client systems with 
widespread botnets. A large-scale attack is an attack with which NATO would be more 
concerned, and would be more likely to result in an Article 5 response.  
When does a cyber-attack deserve an Article 5 response? As with other conflicts 
of the past, NATO has proven that it can adapt to meet the challenging needs of its 
alliance members; cyber conflict is no different. After being the victim of several major 
cyber-attacks in 1999 during Operation Allied Force, NATO formulated its mission for 
cyber space. Its purpose was to “protect its own networks, enhance the capabilities of the 
member states, and to cooperate with partner nations, the European Union (EU), and 
industry.”134 During the 2002 Summit in Prague, NATO adopted the Cyber Defense 
Program and established the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) to 
detect and respond to cyber incidents.135 Even though NATO adopted the Cyber Defense 
Program in 2002, the alliance enjoyed a somewhat peaceful cyber world that did not 
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require much action until the 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia. These DDoS attacks on 
Estonia were an eye-opener for NATO because they showed how serious cyber-attacks 
could be technically and politically. 
Determining when a cyber-attack is worthy of an Article 5 response is difficult, 
particularly since there has yet to be an instance when a cyber-attack was severe enough 
to result in a response. The 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia targeted critical 
telecommunications infrastructure and, while there was no loss of life, did cause 
substantial harm.136 While it is generally believed that the attacks were due to the 
removal of a Soviet-era Red Army statue, no party from within Russia claimed 
responsibility.137 Even though this attack was not publicized to the same extent that the 
9/11 attacks were, there are suspects that could be considered the perpetrator, and harm 
was done.138 This cyber-attack occurred before the creation of the Tallinn Manual, and in 
fact, was the event that helped lead to the creation of the manual. There were serious 
questions raised by NATO’s newest, smallest, and most vulnerable member state to the 
trust and reliability of the security guarantee of the alliance and the willingness of NATO 
to support the most vulnerable member states in situations, such as cyber-attacks.139 
Although the attacks were brought under control after several days, NATO 
officials knew they needed to become more strategic in terms of cyber defense. There 
was no policy in place to handle such an attack, and it was evident that the time had come 
to develop a cyber-attack policy as an alliance to prepare for such an event. During the 
2008 Bucharest Summit, the NATO Cyber Defense Policy was adopted. The point of the 
policy was for alliance members to be able to share best practices with one another in 
terms of cyber defense and come to an alliance member’s aid in the event of a cyber-
attack. The hope was that another country, if in the same situation as Estonia, would not 
feel left behind or forgotten by NATO. At the 2008 Summit, two institutions were created 
with the goal of implementing and supporting the objectives of the Cyber Defense Policy. 
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These new units are known as the Cyber Defense Management Authority (CDMA) and 
the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE).140 These new 
institutions were put under the purview of the Cyber Defense Management Board 
(CDMB) and became operational in April 2008.141 Their overarching mission is to 
initiate and coordinate cyber defenses, review capabilities, and conduct appropriate 
security risk management that aligns with the need to understand, stop, and prevent 
cyber-attacks.142 The CDMA is meant to help each member nation beef up its own cyber 
defense abilities, but has since been replaced by the CDMB to coordinate cyber defense 
in both the civilian and military units.143 
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V. NATO AND CYBER-ATTACKS 
A. IS NATO PREPARED TO RESPOND TO A CYBER-ATTACK? 
The response by NATO to address cyber-attacks largely stems from the 2007 
Estonia attacks, and while the policy took several years to formulate, it represents 
significant progress in addressing the challenges highlighted in Estonia.144 In 2010, the 
Strategic Concept published by NATO highlighted the importance of developing the 
ability to prevent, defend against, and detect cyber-attacks.145 While this failed to include 
specific and concrete strategies, this was the first major step that NATO took towards 
recognizing the severity of cyber-attacks and formulating a response in the event of 
one.146 In June 2011, NATO adopted its most significant cyber policy to date with the 
introduction of the Cyber Defense Policy and the Action Plan. The Cyber Defense Policy 
highlights the new and ever-changing threats to security arising from our dependence on 
critical, but complex, communications and information systems powered by networks and 
computers.147  
A report issued by the Atlantic Council148 lists the main points of the 2011 Cyber 
Defense Policy as the following. 
• Realization that cyber defense is required to perform NATO’s core tasks 
of collective defense and crisis management 
• Recognition that prevention, resilience, and defense of cyber assets is 
critical to NATO and its constituent allies 
• Implementation of robust cyber defense capabilities and centralized 
protection of NATO’s own networks 
• Definition of minimum requirements for cyber defense of national 
networks critical to NATO’s core tasks 
144 “Defending Against Cyber-Attacks,” accessed March 15, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede150611natocyberattacks_/sede150611natocyberattacks_en.p
df. 
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• Assistance to the allies to achieve a minimum level of cyber defense to 
reduce vulnerabilities of national critical infrastructure 
• Engagement with partners, other international organizations, the private 
sector, and academia 
The policy is important in that it gives members a process to use when a cyber-
attack occurs, but also keeps the threshold for what delineates an attack vague, thereby 
allowing NATO to respond to cyber-attacks on a case-by-case basis. To implement this 
new policy, NATO has to receive the proper authority of all 28-member states by having 
each state sign a Memorandum of Understanding. This memorandum requires members 
to report regularly to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) about their progress in regards to 
cyber threats and cyber security. Alliance members would also be able to have 
discussions with NATO about the invocation of Articles 4 and 5 of the Washington 
Treaty if a cyber-attack was significant enough and caused substantial harm. 
Considering how NATO has responded to cyber-attacks over the last few years, 
including the attack on Sony Pictures by North Korea, it is difficult to ascertain if NATO 
is prepared for a cyber-attack outside of the policies the organization has to rely on for 
direction in how to respond. While it is understood that a cyber-attack can qualify as an 
event that could require a NATO response, there has not yet been an event worthy of a 
response. The damage done in Estonia could have been substantial had Russia, or non-
state Russian actors, targeted the transportation infrastructure. Would NATO have 
responded had there been any harm caused to people or property? While it is nearly 
impossible to say for certain one way or another, speculation could be made that if people 
were harmed to the same extent, or similar extent, as those injured in the United States 
during 9/11, there could have been an Article 5 response.  
As for having the appropriate policy in place to respond to a cyber-attack against 
an enemy, NATO cemented such policy at the Wales Summit in 2014 when all member 
states agreed to stand with, and come to the aid of, any member state suffering from a 
major cyber-attack.149 There are many elements of this acknowledgment of mutual 
149 Robert Lemos, “In Case of Cyber Attack: NATO Members Ready to Pledge Mutual Defense,” 
Arstechnica, Risk Assessment, accessed March 14, 2015, http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/09/in-case-
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defense in the case of a cyber-attack, but the most important is recognition of the 
importance of cyber defense for the NATO alliance and application of international law 
to cyberspace.150 NATO agreed to “intensify” its cooperation with the cyber industry and 
work to ensure their own systems are secure from cyber-attacks.151 Furthermore, NATO 
made clear that they will treat a serious cyber-attack in the same manner in which they 
would treat a serious kinetic attack, with an attack against one member state treated as if 
there had been an attack on all member states.152 
B. UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD A CYBER-ATTACK TRIGGER 
AN ARTICLE 5 RESPONSE? 
Determining at what point a cyber-attack would trigger an Article 5 response is 
very complex, and until there is an actual attack worthy of such a reaction, the issue will 
remain murky.153 On September 11, 2001, one would have been hard pressed to find 
individuals who believed that commercial airliners would be used as weapons against the 
American people, and in a single day be exploited in the murder of nearly 3,000 
American civilians. Similarly, while it might be hard to imagine computers being used as 
weapons against the United States or any other state, NATO member or not, terrorists are 
actively using electronics to further their cause, making the issue of cyber-attacks as 
important as any other national security threat, such as terrorism.  
To be able to answer this question appropriately, the conditions under which a 
cyber-attack could invoke an Article 5 response needs to be explored, as well as what 
NATO currently believes about such attacks. At the previously discussed summit in 
Wales in the fall of 2014, the alliance acknowledged that if a cyber-attack was 
sufficiently severe, it could trigger a NATO Article 5 response. However, as with most 
political and military statements, the alliance was unsurprisingly vague about what the 
magnitude of a cyber-attack would have to be to do so, adding that such attacks would be 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis. It is important to note that neither NATO, nor anyone 





                                                 
else, has yet experienced a truly massive cyber-attack causing the level of damage seen in 
9/11. Although the Estonia attacks caused NATO to open its eyes and ramp up its cyber 
security capabilities, they were not severe enough to invoke an Article 5 response from 
NATO.  
Along with needing to meet the requirements of an Article 5 response, such as 
serious bodily harm or damage to property, there is the question of attribution. The 
United Nation addresses the issue of attribution of conduct to a specific state. The 
international body writes that the conduct of anyone, individual, corporation, or 
collective, who is linked to the state, whether by nationality, incorporation, or habitual 
residence, can be attributed to that state, regardless of their connection to the 
government.154 Yet, in terms of international law, there is need to show at least some 
connection, either through direction, instigation, or control, of the conduct in order for the 
state to be attributed to the action.155 International law also requires that attribution be 
based on more than just the recognition of a factual causality, and that it not be decided 
through implications and assumptions alone.156 Article 4 of the United Nations charter 
states “the conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other 
… organ includes any person or entity, which has that status in accordance with the 
internal law of the State,”157. While this does not proscribe what attribution is within 
NATO, the United Nations clearly defines attribution, and with member states of NATO 
also signatories to the United Nations, it is expected that similar values would be held.  
Unfortunately, determining attribution does not create a definite understanding of 
the threshold of attribution needed to invoke Article 5 in the event of a cyber-attack. In 
the case of Estonia, the cyber-attack was understood to be of Russian origin, although as 
is typical in cases of cyber-attacks, it is difficult to definitely identify the specific 
154 “Attribution of Conduct to a State,” 27, accessed March 15, 2015 http://legal.un.org/legislative 
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aggressor(s). In contrast, the cyber attacks against Sony Pictures were attributed to North 
Korea. Nevertheless, like the Estonian attacks, they likely did not cause enough damage 
to actual property or people to qualify for an Article 5 response. However, had the attack 
not been against Sony, but against a financial institution, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange or the Federal Reserve, the response might have been stronger. Although the 
United States publicly charged North Korea with conducting the attack, a broader 
distribution of the U.S. evidence basis for this conclusion would probably have been 
required for a collective NATO response. In any event, the hack likely did not meet the 
other elements necessary for an Article 5 response.  
C. HOW WOULD NATO RESPOND TO A CYBER-ATTACK UNDER 
ARTICLE 5? 
To answer this question, it is important to look at the first (and only) time NATO 
invoked an Article 5 response; namely, following the 9/11 attacks on the United States. 
When the partners of the alliance first wrote the Washington Treaty, it was initially to 
deter the Russians from expanding and to deter nuclear warfare at the onset of the Cold 
War. Article 5 is purposefully vague to give NATO considerable room to maneuver. 
Before the 9/11 attacks led by Al Qaida, it would have been nearly impossible for 
anyone, anywhere, including the framers of the Washington Treaty, to imagine such an 
attack. Likewise, at the 2014 summit in Wales, NATO announced that it would and could 
invoke an Article 5 response to a cyber-attack, and that the ambiguity would stand.158 
NATO’s Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, NATO’s assistant secretary general for “emerging 
security challenges,” made the following remarks: 
[T]here’s no predetermined threshold…there was a conscious decision by 
the allies in this policy that there is benefit in keeping flexibility and 
ambiguity…article 5 was by design something that should be invoked 
politically by [member] nations in a specific context, on a case by case 
basis…article 5 was never designed to be triggered by a certain threshold. 
158 Sydney J. Freedberg, “NATO Hews to Strategic Ambiguity on Cyber Deterrence,” Breaking 
Defense, November 7, 2014, http://breakingdefense.com/2014/11/natos-hews-to-strategic-ambiguity-on-
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The only time it was invoked was after 9/11, which was a scenario that 
had never been contemplated by the founding partners.159  
In this same vein, Christopher Painter, the U.S.’ State Department cyber 
coordinator said: 
The NATO leaders’ declaration that international law including the UN 
Charter, the Law of Armed Conflict, international humanitarian law, etc. 
applies in cyberspace just like it does in the physical world…[t]his is a 
clear statement that this is not a lawless space. There was some doubt 
before. There was some thought you had different rules entirely for the 
cyber world than the physical world, which made no sense and in fact 
would be very destabilizing.160 
In light of the recent developments of NATO, it would seem to be in NATO’s 
best interest to remain ambiguous and allow the organization to approach its response to a 
cyber-attack on a case-by-case basis. For instance, the attacks on Estonia might require 
intervention on behalf of the Estonian people due to the fact they are a smaller, lesser 
defensible state. Estonia would not be successful standing up against Russia, and as 
Russia becomes more aggressive in the former-Soviet bloc region, small states like 
Estonia are at risk. If another attack were to occur against Estonia, the attacks would have 
to be more severe to invoke an Article 5 response. Such a response would enable NATO 
states to act as if they too have been attacked as per the mutual defense announcement 
against cyber-attacks at the Wales Summit. Yet, if the United States is attacked in a 
similar manner, there likely does not need to be the same scale of defense taken, because 
the United States has more resources and capabilities to respond on its own. Remaining 
ambiguous allows NATO to choose the best opportunities for supporting and defending 
member states. 
Before it could decide on a response, NATO would first need to consider the 
severity of the attack to determine the appropriate level of response, whether it be 
sanctions, cutting off financial aid to the offending country, or a boots on the ground 
campaign. However, even while retaining flexibility in its response to a cyber-attack, 
159 Freedberg, “NATO Hews to Strategic Ambiguity on Cyber Deterrence.” 
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NATO understands the importance of cyber defense. It aims to deter cyber-attacks 
against its networks and member country’s networks through strong cyber defenses, 
although NATO has yet to fully seek what Cold War theorists have called “deterrence by 
denial,” and which could be an effective mechanism.161 With such a posture, the enemy 
need not be convinced that a cyber-attack will be followed by retaliation or punishment; 
instead, it is only necessary to convince the enemy that the initial attack will have no 
effect.162  
D. HOW SHOULD NATO RESPOND TO A CYBER-ATTACK AGAINST A 
MEMBER COUNTRY? 
To attempt to answer this question, this author looks to the recommendations of 
Jason Healy and Klara Tothova Jordan presented in the brief to the Atlantic Council 
titled, “NATO’s Cyber Capabilities: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow.” Healy and 
Tothova Jordan state that the recommendations they give are generic and can be used by 
any organization or government in trying to prevent or combat a cyber-attack. Speaking 
in the abstract, it is possible that, if a cyber-attack were to occur, that NATO could use 
the following list in helping to either prevent of combat a cyber-attack. The following 
lists their recommendations. 
• Stick to the basics 
• Pursue a relevant standard 
• Fight through cyber-attacks 
• Develop an agenda for private sector collaboration 
• Push multinational sharing of baseline capabilities 
• Reinforce coordination with the EU 
• Consider offensive coordination, not capability 
• Focus on Articles 4 and 5 
• Be prepared for attribution  
• Support beyond RRTs 
• Pool and share IT 
NATO could utilize each recommendation in the event of a cyber-attack against a 
member state. The first recommendation, stick to the basics, essentially means focus on 
161 Freedberg, “NATO Hews to Strategic Ambiguity on Cyber Deterrence.” 
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defense.163 Focusing on defense, which was the original NATO mission against the 
spread of communism against Europe, includes focusing on coordination and training, 
two important segments of defense.164 Focusing on defense also requires a focus on 
policy, and ensuring that the policy of the organization is in alignment with the goals and 
purpose. The second recommendation, pursuing a relevant (security) standard, such as 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013, will help ensure resilience and performance when the state, or 
NATO, is facing a crisis.165  
The third recommendation, fighting through cyber-attacks, is an interesting 
strategy that could be surprisingly useful. It utilizes resiliency plans, specialized incident 
response teams, and redundant hosting for critical infrastructure sites in an attempt to 
keep cyber-attacks from becoming NAC issues.166 By fighting through an attack and not 
surrendering the network, Healy and Tothova Jordan suggest that militaries should just 
react and operate, much like they do when there is a fighter jet flying through hostile 
territory; neither the pilot nor military seeks out NAC permission before flying.167 The 
fourth recommendation, developing an agenda for private sector collaboration, is perhaps 
the easiest and most efficient recommendation made because many organizations already 
have the capability to fight, and win, against a cyber-attack. Private organizations might 
work with governments and firms from other states, providing that organization a 
substantial amount of information and knowledge that could be utilized in a positive and 
purposeful manner by NATO.168  
In a similar vein, the fifth recommendation, pushing multinational sharing of 
baseline capabilities, is another strategy that NATO could embrace for bettering 
preparing and preventing cyber-attacks, both against the organization and member states. 
Instead of NATO seeking out an entirely different and separate IT unit for each member 







                                                 
state, NATO members can collaborate, as they likely use identical systems and 
switches.169 Sharing access, and thus information, could result in better performance and 
better outcomes in times of crisis, which is the purpose of the organization.170 The sixth 
recommendation, reinforcing coordination with the EU, would help to overcome issues, 
particularly regarding infrastructure, and the EU and NATO should collaborate and work 
together during crises, as well as during peacetime.171  
The seventh recommendation, consider offensive coordination, not capability, 
allows units from different countries to work together, but without necessarily sharing 
information, which might be top secret or proprietary.172 This would allow for better 
communication of objectives, without risking national secrets. Having the ability to 
coordinate is important during a crises and having the skill-sets that such coordination 
would provide would be invaluable. Focusing on Articles 4 and 5, the eighth 
recommendation recognizes that cyber conflict is likely to take place during an existing 
geopolitical crisis with a known national adversary, making it possible to prepare in 
advance for such situations173  
The ninth recommendation, be prepared for attribution, similarly recognizes the 
geopolitical context surrounding cyber-attacks. In such clearly defined situations, it 
would not require substantial investigation to determine the aggressor nation, making the 
invocation of Articles 4 and 5 much easier and clearer.174 The tenth recommendation, 
providing support beyond Rapid Reaction Teams, could allow for a much wider range of 
actions that could be utilized after invoking Article 5.175 This could be something as 
simple as providing satellite telephones and access to satellite data or more complicated 
like intelligence sharing and coordinating civilian telecommunication organizations 








                                                 
during a cyber-attack.176 Finally, the eleventh recommendation, pooling and sharing of 
IT resources, could cut costs and provide collaboration and coordination, which would 
better provide defenses. Healey and Tothova Jordan use the example of Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and the benefits both would have if they shared procurements of cloud 
computing, server storage, and military structures if they operated together as a single 
entity instead of two separate and distinct entities.177 
Healy and Tothova Jordan discuss the importance of defense as being one of the 
most effective ways NATO should respond to cyber-attacks. They also noted the benefits 
of deterrence and that deterrence by punishment might be achieved in several ways. 
• Any nation choosing another major attack even on a small ally, such as 
Estonia, now knows a very well understood path for NATO’s political 
leadership is available to escalate the situation to an Article 4 consultation 
or Article 5 invocation of collective defense. 
• Both the White House and Pentagon have been extremely clear that 
Alliance commitments extend to major cyber-attacks. 
• Although NATO does not have an offensive cyber capability, several 
member nations do have those capabilities that could be used in 
response.178 




                                                 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
This thesis recommends that NATO take the following actions: 
• Establish. As part of its cyber defense program, NATO should establish an 
early warning system that lets the alliance and its members know when an 
attack is happening within enough time to stop it. 
• Focus. NATO’s deterrence strategy should focus more on denial. 
• Encourage. NATO and its allies should encourage information sharing 
among its member nations and within the alliance itself. 
• Share. NATO and its allies should encourage information sharing within 
and among its member nations. 
• Maintain ambiguity. NATO should on what justifies an Article 5 response 
in order to ensure that NATO can act when justified. 
Looking at the first recommendation, as part of its cyber defense program, NATO 
needs to have an early warning system that lets the alliance and its members know when 
an attack is happening within enough time to stop it. Establishing such a system is crucial 
for NATO and its allies. Above all else, it is truly the most important recommendation. 
By defending its own networks and alliance countries doing the same, the need for an 
Article 5 response would be unnecessary. An article 5 response, of course, is a last resort 
when all else has failed.  
In their essay to NATO in the Atlantic Council: Issue Brief, Jason Healey and 
Leendert van Bochoven explain why an early warning system is so important. They 
explain that NATO needs “intelligence-based indications and warning, to give advance 
notice of geopolitical situations that might lead to serious cyber conflict.”179 To achieve 
this, NATO needs to phase in a system as opposed to looking for a perfect solution to 
cyber security. Healey and von Bochoven suggest a phased adaptive approach for cyber 
defense and believe that NATO is on the right track with its monitoring system, which is 
179 Jason Healey and Leendert van Bochoven, “Strategic Cyber Early Warning: Phased Adapting 




                                                 
a decent first step.180 As part of the phased adaptive approach, “later phases could 
consider a more sophisticated sensor grid integrated with militaries and national grids, 
once there is sufficient budget and trust in the Alliance.”181 It would make it possible for 
political leaders to act in the case of a cyber-attack serious enough to invoke an Article 4 
or 5 responses. Likewise, it would allow leaders to determine if a cyber-attack is simply a 
nuisance that does not require any action.  
The second recommendation is that NATO’s deterrence strategy should focus 
more on denial. Deterrence by denial essentially means that it would be pointless for one 
country to launch a cyber-attack against another country because the attack would be 
futile. Essentially, deterrence by denial frustrates the attacker, leading to an abandonment 
of the attack.182 Typically, deterrence is established through punishment, with the threat 
of retaliation by the victim, or the victim’s allies, being sufficient to prevent such an 
attack.183 But the threat of punishment is often not enough, especially in situations where 
attribution is difficult to establish, making deterrence by denial an attractive 
alternative.184 Whereas Article 5 gives NATO some means of deterrence by punishment, 
strengthening its cyber defense capabilities would enable NATO to also draw upon 
deterrence by denial.185 In addition to deterrence by denial and punishment, deterrence 
theory covers such measures as making declarations, establishing credibility and 
assurance, creating fear, and making cost-benefit calculations.186 Employing multiple 
measures together can help to prevent engagement. 
The third recommendation, that NATO and its allies encourage information 
sharing among its member nations and within, suggests it would be beneficial to NATO 
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and the members of the alliance to share information between agencies. Hannes Krause 
addresses this topic in his article, “NATO on Its Way towards a Comfort Zone in Cyber 
Defence,” which is one part in a series of papers known collectively as The Tallinn 
Papers. Krause emphasizes that for NATO truly to be successful in cyber defense, 
transparency is key.187 Information sharing would be a great starting point for further 
political discussions surrounding cyber defense, and the discussions should include 
“information related to situational awareness, national developments and existing 
capabilities.”188 This would be a vast improvement over the current system where 
information is shared on a need to know basis, and is one of the key recommendations 
made by Heeley and Tothova Jordan.189 
The fourth recommendation states that NATO needs to hire or train a team of 
experts in hacking, computer forensics, and cyber defense to aid its own organization and 
come to the aid of member countries that have experienced a breach in their security 
networks. Following the Wales Summit and the declaration that a cyber-attack could be 
treated like a kinetic one, it might become easier for policy to be drafted that will 
encourage the sharing of information. Heeley and Tothova Jordan stress this as an 
important recommendation that NATO could embrace because they could bring in 
experts from each nation to share information and collaborate to create a better, more 
efficient, and superior system. This expertise would be needed if NATO’s or a member 
country’s defense systems have been seriously breached. They can be on call in the 
meantime until NATO and its member countries adopt a more sophisticated defense 
system as suggested by Healey and von Bochoven.190 
Finally, NATO needs to maintain ambiguity on what justifies an Article 5 
response. As mentioned previously, ambiguity has served NATO well. A set threshold 
for when NATO will invoke an Article 5 response to a cyber-attack on a member country 
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is not necessary. This ambiguity has historically served the alliance well, as demonstrated 
by the 9/11 attacks. If the alliance had said weapons were only include guns, bullets, 
tanks, and bombs, it would have set a threshold precluding a NATO response to attacks 
that turned four planes into improvised missiles. The larger issue of ambiguity is that 
there is no set definition of what constitutes an armed attack and what circumstances 
dictate a collective response, as per Article 5. Remaining ambiguous on the severity 
threshold of a cyber-attack allows the alliance to act in cases of future cyber-attacks that 
cause severe damage, but also allow NATO to refrain from over-reacting, even if an 
event is a cyber, or kinetic, attack as per a definition. It would be a mistake to set a 
threshold for attacks that cannot currently be anticipated. 
When NATO was originally formed, it was with the purpose to be unambiguous, 
with the promise of “massive retaliation” by Eisenhower. This was meant to constantly 
act as a reminder to the Soviet Union and the Red Army that if they were to surge into 
Western Europe, in no uncertain terms NATO would respond with nuclear weapons. 
Ambiguity is useful in times, and at other times, it is not. Had NATO been ambiguous in 
dealing with the Soviet Union, there could have been opportunity for the Red Army to 
advance further across Europe, to test and see what NATO, and the United States, would 
allow them to get away with, without an attack. Ambiguity can also cause problems, 
particularly in the event of a cyber-attack with some members feeling an attack might 
warrant retaliation through Article 5, with others feeling that the necessary thresholds 
have not been met. It is important for NATO to have a clear understanding, or general 
belief, of what would constitute a serious enough cyber-attack in order to respond, but not 
through official policy or rules to ensure proper consideration.  
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has reviewed the history of NATO and its role in the world, and has 
found that since its creation post-WWII, the NATO alliance has been able to adapt to 
changing times. It remains an organization that promotes peace but will use force if 
necessary. NATO has taken on the new challenge of cyber-attacks that the current world 
faces today. It has also taken steps to prevent cyber-attacks on itself and member 
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countries, as well as to make it clear to any person, nation, or organization that an Article 
5 response will be invoked in the case of a serious cyber-attack that can be deemed an 
armed attack according to scale, effects, and attacker motivation.  
Article 5 is the most important article in the Washington Treaty, on which the 
entire alliance is hinged. As in the 9/11 attacks on the United States by a foreign enemy, 
NATO showed it was a force to be reckoned with when it invoked Article 5 for the first 
time in its history. It came to the aid of the United States and sent a loud resounding 
message to the world that terrorism would not be tolerated.  
Since the cyber world is still so new and continues to advance each day with new 
technologies, NATO is still trying to find the best policies and best course of action to 
take in response to the new threats to peace and democracy that cyber-attacks pose on the 
alliance and this new world. NATO welcomes and many experts on cyberspace give it 
recommendations on how to deal with this new threat. The cyber world is too new for 
NATO to bind its hands, so to speak, with rigid rules and laws regarding when, how, and 
why it would invoke Article 5 in the case of a cyber-attack on a member country. In 
response, at the 2014 summit in Wales, the alliance made it clear that a cyber-attack can 
and will invoke an Article 5 response. It also made it clear that ambiguity has served the 
alliance well, and it refused to define the kind of attack that would invoke an Article 5 
response.  
However, that is not to say that NATO has been irresponsible or lackadaisical in 
trying to give some understanding on when a cyber-attack becomes an armed attack. 
With the help of experts in the field of cyberspace, international law, and policymakers, 
the Tallinn Manual was written and published to provide guidance to NATO and any 
other international or national alliance or government seeking it. Although the Manual 
offers guidance on what scale, effects, and attacker motivation would be severe enough to 
fall into the category of an armed attack, it does not give specific details, only a 
conceptual idea of what an armed attack might look like in the cyber realm. Then, with 
the guidance of the Manual, and international law, there could be a better understanding 
of what would then invoke an Article 5 response. Nevertheless, it is not, and was not 
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intended to be, a complete go-to-guide for how each member country should conduct 
itself in the cyber world.  
As this thesis was written, many more cyber-attacks have targeted government 
agencies, unsuspecting consumers, and companies that have cost victims billions of 
dollars worldwide. That situation, in itself, is a serious issue. As briefly mentioned earlier 
in the thesis, the hacking of Sony by North Korea is a perfect example of the varying 
degrees of cyber-attack and the varying level of harm it can cause. The American 
government claims North Korea is responsible for the hacking in response to the 
previously discussed film released by Sony Pictures. While a mysterious group called 
“Guardians of Peace” claimed responsibility for the attacks, the United States 
government is confident that the true perpetrator is the North Korean government. This 
situation has parallels to the 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia. We do know that many 
persons of Russian ethnicity participated, not only in cyber-attacks, but also in street 
protests. But attribution to the Russian government was harder, and Russia was able to 
evade responsibility by simply denying even indirect involvement. 
The Estonia attack fortunately did not result in substantial damage to the country, 
and the cyber infrastructure was able to be returned to its stable condition. In contrast, the 
film company lost some of the millions of dollars it had invested in the film because of 
the initial decision to cancel its scheduled release. This author believes that the Sony 
attack was much more serious, at least in terms of financial losses, than the Estonian 
attack due to the damage done to a major international organization. Sony’s reputation 
was tarnished by the private, embarrassing, and proprietary information stolen by the 
attacks and then disclosed to the public. More importantly, though, the Sony hack 
demonstrated that cyber-attacks can effectively muzzle freedoms of speech and artistic 
expression if the government does not effectively respond. The United States did not seek 
an Article 5 declaration against North Korea, mainly because it did not have to; U.S. 
responses were sufficient to induce Sony to release the film after all and to result in no 
subsequent adverse North Korean actions of any significance. Nevertheless, the incident 
showed that cyber-attacks can threaten vital information flows by intimidating people, as 
well as compromising networks.  
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As part of this conclusion, and based on the research done by this author, it is 
important to look at areas of understanding and unresolved issues of the current research. 
Points made in the earlier summary are reiterated as follows.  
C. AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND UNDERSTANDING 
• Experts do not have consensus when it comes to defining the severity of a 
cyber-attack. While the Tallinn Manual offers a good first step in 
understanding if the threshold has been met, there still needs to be 
application of it in the real world for a consensus to be built. But, it can be 
agreed upon that a cyber-riot, as in the Estonian case, should not be 
confused with a cyber-attack that could kill or injure large populations of 
people or cause extreme damage to property or financial markets. 
• Ambiguity has served NATO well. Although setting a precise threshold 
for when a cyber-attack rises to the level of an armed kinetic attack might 
make it easier for NATO to invoke Article 5, choosing to remain 
ambiguous gives the alliance more flexibility in responding to cyber-
attacks. Moreover, it would be difficult for NATO to set a threshold for an 
attack it has never seen before, which was the case on September 11, 
2001.  
• Experts on the topic of cyber-attacks agree that the rules that apply in the 
kinetic world should apply to the cyber realm. Therefore, invoking an 
Article 5 response in the case of a cyber-attack on a member country is an 
acceptable outcome. 
D. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
Very little research has been done to address what is to be done when it is not 
known with perfect certainty who committed a cyber-attack. In the Estonian case, Russia 
was suspected of being involved, but it was difficult to prove. While Russia was also 
suspected of committing cyber-attacks on Georgia in 2008, once again, attribution was 
difficult to prove and Russia did not suffer any consequences.  
NATO, and the rest of the world, has not yet seen the true extent of damage that 
could be done if there were to be a violent and deadly cyber war. Now, experts on the 
topic of cyber-attacks can only speculate about what a severe cyber-attack would look 
like. Stuxnet might be the closest example of a real world cyber-attack. As individuals 
and nations disrupt the cyber world with cyber-attacks, causing damage to the real world, 
NATO needs to continue to adapt to meet the needs of its alliance members in the cyber 
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world, while sending a resounding message to the world that cyber-attacks on member 
nations will not be tolerated.  
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